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ABSTRACT
As  the twenty-first century  begins,  an 
increasing number of developing nations are 
aggressively pursuing the use of nuclear 
power as  a source of electricity. Much 
attention within the  international security 
community has  been placed on the  growth of 
reactors  within the context of nuclear 
w eap o n s d ev e l o p m en t an d n u c l ear 
terrorism.  A major accident involving a 
nuclear reactor or stored nuclear waste may 
be a more likely possibility,  albeit one that 
has received considerably less  attention in 
terms  of disaster planning and response.  In 
t h e a f t e r m a t h  o f s u c h a d i s a s t e r , 
intervention by the  United States,  and other 
Western nations, may be warranted. In the 
context of homeland security operations  in 
such a scenario,  major challenges  will 
revolve around efforts to  detect and deter the 
importation of goods contaminated with 
radionuclides, and screening and processing 
of refugees  and immigrants from nations 
and territories affected by the nuclear 
accident.
INTRODUCTION
The expansion  of nuclear power  into 
developing nations raises the likelihood of a 
disaster  similar  to that of Fukushima, Japan, 
taking  place in  a state  that is profoundly  ill 
equipped to deal with  the consequences of 
fallout  on  a  large section  of its habitable 
territory.  In  such  a scenario,  the possibility 
that  appreciable,  even  hazardous, amounts of 
radioactive  contamination would be present 
on  travelers and goods arriving  in  the United 
States is not far-fetched. Depending  (of 
course) on  the severity  and extent  of such 
exposure,  Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)  operations may  be of considerable 
importance in  promoting  the public  health  of 
travelers and the economic stability  of 
importers and other  individuals/companies 
involved with international trade.  
While  securing nuclear  materials in  an 
effort  to stymie clandestine efforts to 
fabricate explosives is a  worthy  goal, too little 
attention  has been  placed on the potentially 
disastrous consequences that would ensue 
from  an accident  resulting from  a  legitimate 
use of nuclear  power. What  would happen  if 
tomorrow  an  accident  of the magnitude of 
Fukushima or  Chernobyl were to occur  in 
Jordan? Or  Bangladesh? Or  Vietnam? Would 
the affected country  be capable of addressing 
the accident? What  DHS operations would 
need to be expanded or  enhanced in  order  to 
deal  with  the consequences of a  major 
nuclear  disaster  in  a  developing  nation? As 
the Fukushima  accident  has indicated,  these 
questions are in need of consideration.
THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR CRISIS
As this is written,  in  January  2012, the most 
worrisome aspects of the crisis created by  the 
earthquake and tsunami- related damage to 
the six  reactors at  the Fukushima  Daiichi I 
nuclear  power  plant in  Fukushima,  Japan, 
appear to have been successfully managed.
The crisis,  which  began  on  March  11,  2011, 
was the worst  associated with  a nuclear 
power  operation  since the Chernobyl  disaster 
of April 1986.  The sequence of events,  as is 
best understood,  started with  the earthquake, 
which  resulted in  the automatic shutdown  of 
the three reactors,  Nos.  1,  2,  and 3  (Nos. 4, 5, 
and 6  were shut down  for  maintenance),  in 
operation  at  the Daiichi complex.  The 
earthquake disrupted electrical power  to the 
plant; as was designed in the event  of such  an 
emergency, the backup electrical system 
provided power  to run  the water-based 
cooling  systems for  the reactors.  However, 
the forty-five-foot  tsunami wave reaching 
shore forty  minutes after  the earthquake 
brought  all  emergency  generators offline. 
With  no way  to circulate water  through  the 
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reactor  pressure vessels (RPV)  housing  the 
reactor  cores,  the temperatures of the cores 
increased, leading  to “meltdowns”  of the fuel 
assemblies in Reactors 1, 2 and 3.1 
The high  temperatures converted the 
water  in the Reactor 1  RPV, and associated 
piping, to hydrogen gas.  It  is thought that  the 
escape/venting  of hydrogen  gasses into the 
primary  containment  vessel  (PCV),  the 
structure surrounding  the RPV, led to an 
explosion  on  March  12  that  destroyed a  large 
portion  of the Reactor 1  building. It is also 
thought that hydrogen  gas generated in 
Reactor  3  not  only  caused a smaller  explosion 
within  its RPV, but also leaked to the 
adjacent building  housing Reactor  No.  4. This 
resulted in an  explosion  on  March  15  that 
removed a  portion  of the roof of the Reactor  4 
building, and collaterally  damaged the 
Reactor 3 building. 2
Figure 1. Reactor No. 4 (foreground) and Reactor 
No. 3 (background) at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power installation, March 16, 2011 
(photograph courtesy of Kyodo News/AP)
There was considerable  fear  early  on  in  the 
disaster  regarding  the cooling  ponds, which 
contain  up to 1,400 tons of water  to a  depth 
of thirty-nine feet  and are  located atop each 
of the six  reactor  buildings.  These ponds are 
used to store anywhere from  fifty  to 151  tons 
of spent  fuel rods containing  uranium  pellets 
within  a  zirconium-alloy  cladding.  The March 
15  explosion  at  the Reactor  4  building 
resulted in the creation of a  leak, and a  loss of 
water, from  the cooling  pond located atop the 
building. This raised the possibility  that the 
heat from  the pool’s spent  fuel rods would 
eventually  “boil off”  all  remaining water  from 
the pool,  leaving the rods exposed to the air. 
This would increase their  temperature, 
leading  to their  catching  fire, followed by  the 
strong likelihood of an explosion  involving 
most (if not all)  the fuel rods in  the pool. This 
catastrophe was averted through  improvised 
measures, including  dumps of water  from  a 
helicopter, spraying  water  into the pond 
using  fire truck  water  cannons, and,  starting 
on  March  18, the  use of concrete pumping 
vehicles flown  into Japan  from  the United 
States. Ultimately, the continuous deposition 
of nearly  1,100 square feet of seawater/fresh 
water  into the pool on a  daily  basis prevented 
overheating  of the fuel rods,  and permitted 
the implementation of more permanent 
cooling systems in May. 3
By  June,  3,700 workers were laboring  on 
cleanup and restoration  efforts,  which 
included pumping 500 metric  tons of sweater 
into the facility  daily,  in  order  to maintain  the 
cooling  capacities for the three reactors and 
four  spent fuel pools.  Gradually,  new  systems 
were installed,  or  existing  systems repaired, 
to recirculate coolant  among the reactors and 
spent fuel pools.4   
In  October  a  covering  structure 177  feet 
high  was erected over  the Reactor  1  building 
to contain  further  discharges of radioactive 
materials;  it  is intended to remain  in  place for 
at  least  two years.  Similar  coverings are 
planned for  placement  over  Reactor  2  and 
Reactor  3  in  2012.  On  December  16,  2011, 
Prime Minister  Yoshihiko Noda  announced 
that the Fukushima plant was in  “cold 
shutdown”; in  other  words,  the temperatures 
in  the damaged reactors had been reduced to 
below  the boiling point  of water.  The long-
term  plans for  remediation  of the Fukushima 
Daiichi  plant call for  identification  and repair 
of leaks or  cracks in the primary  containment 
vessels and reactor  buildings, followed by  the 
removal,  and interment,  of fuel  from  the 
damaged reactors. As well, the 90,000  tons of 
contaminated seawater and freshwater  used 
to cool the reactors in the aftermath  of the 
disaster  will  need to be  stored on  site until 
they  can  be decontaminated and released into 
the environment.  The overall  repair  and 
remediation  efforts at  the Daiichi plant  are 
estimated to take twenty-five years to 
complete.5 
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While  the exact  quantities never  will  be 
known, the Nuclear  and Industrial Safety 
Agency  of Japan  (NISA) has estimated that 
130 petabecquerels (PBq)  of radioactive 
iodine (131I) and 6.1  PBq of radioactive cesium 
(137Cs) 	  were released into the atmosphere due 
to the explosions.6 This is approximately  5  to 
6  percent of the amounts released by  the 
Chernobyl disaster.7 
Approximately  100,000 people,  in 
evacuation  zones extending  up to forty 
kilometers (equivalent  to twenty-five miles) 
from  the reactor  site,  were evacuated or 
otherwise “displaced”; when, and if, they  can 
return  to their homes is unclear.  The 
Japanese government has delineated a 
“contamination  zone”  of 930 square miles 
that will be targeted for  comprehensive 
cleanup; such  an  operation  will not  be trivial. 
Based on measurements of 137Cs in soil 
samples, one study  has estimated that  the 
region  northwest  of the plant  has been 
contaminated with  1,000  kilobecquerels 
(KBq) per square meter. By  way  of 
comparison,  in  the aftermath  of the 
Chernobyl accident,  Soviet  authorities 
p e r m a n e n t l y  e v a c u a t e d a r e a s w i t h 
approximately  1,500  kBq per square meter. 
Because the half-life of 137Cs is thirty  years, 
s o i l c o n t a m i n a t i o n  a n d a s s o c i a t e d 
remediation  efforts (such  as the removal  of 
topsoil from  affected cropland) will  have 
long-term  impacts on the future of 
agriculture and food production  in  many 
areas of Japan.8 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES 
HOMELAND SECURITY
If mainstream  media  coverage was any 
indicator,  DHS operations in  response to the 
Fukushima  accident initially  focused on 
screening  airplane passengers (and cargo) 
arriving  in  the United States from  Japan  for 
the presence of radionuclides.  Screening  of 
passengers apparently  began on  March  17, 
2011, with  Secretary  Janet  Napolitano 
announcing  the screening being performed 
“in  an  exercise  of caution.” 9  One passenger 
arriving  at  Los Angeles International  Airport 
described uniformed personnel (i.e., US 
Customs and Border  Protection  officials, 
CBP) “[as] holding some sort of device and 
sweeping it over people as they walked by.” 10
With  regard to cargo,  in  the port of 
Oakland, the CBP was screening  incoming 
containers from  Japan  for  the  presence of 
radioactive contamination using  truck-
mounted devices as well as hand-held 
devices.  The devices (radiation  portal 
monitors, or  RPM),  installed as part of a 
collaborative effort  by  the DHS Domestic 
Nuclear  Detection  Office and CBP, are 
capable of detecting  gamma and neutron 
emissions.11 Not only  were containers being 
scanned,  but  trucks exiting  the shipyard with 
cargo also were required to pass through  a 
scanning  portal.  Encouragingly,  as of early 
April 2011,  no incoming  containers tested 
positive. 12
With  the discovery  later  in  the Spring  of 
2011  that  spinach  and milk  from  producers 
located more than  thirty  miles from  the 
Fukushima installation  contained higher  than 
normal amounts of 131I,  the Food and Drug 
Administration  (FDA) banned imports of 
foods produced in  the Fukushima  region  into 
the United States.  In  collaboration  with  the 
CBP, the FDA  was investigating the use of the 
Automated Targeting  System  to identify  and 
track  non-food items, such  as drugs and 
biologics,  which  also are imported from 
Japan and are under FDA regulation. 13 
The DHS also sponsored environmental 
and food monitoring  studies related to the 
Fukushima accident; for  example,  a  team  of 
scientists from  the University  of California, 
Berkeley,  collected rainwater  in  the San 
Francisco area  during  the interval  of March 
16-26  and detected radioisotopes of iodine 
and cesium  originating  from  the accident  site, 
albeit at  levels considered too small  to have 
effects on  human  health.  Expansion of the 
testing to weeds, vegetables,  and milk  from 
the San  Francisco area  also detected fission 
products,  again  at levels not considered to be 
harmful.14
T h e d i s a s t e r  a t  F u k u s h i m a  w a s 
unexpected in  the sense that  it  was caused by 
a  combination  of natural events thought 
highly  unlikely  by  engineers and nuclear 
safety  advisors: an  earthquake, which  the 
installation  putatively  was designed to 
withstand, followed by  a  tsunami, which 
prevented the restoration  of electrical  power. 
Within the span  of twenty-four-hours one of 
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the most  technologically  advanced nations on 
the planet was confronted with  a  nuclear 
disaster  occurring  amidst widespread 
destruction to the national infrastructure 
caused by the tsunami. 
The resolution  of the problems at the 
Fukushima plant remains uncertain, but  the 
disaster  is one that raises important  issues, 
issues with  relevance to the operations at 
DHS.
The question  could be asked,  why  does 
DHS necessarily  need to be involved in 
screening  incoming passengers and cargo for 
radionuclides associated with  a  nuclear 
accident  overseas? In  the aftermath  of the 
Fukushima disaster,  there has been  a  dearth 
of information  on  the amounts of such 
contaminants present  on the clothing  and 
skin  of travelers,  as well as the exterior  and 
interior  areas of aircraft.  A  CDC staffer 
indicated that  there was no evidence that 
travelers returning  to the United States from 
Japan  were “contaminated with  material at  a 
leve l o f concern.” 15  I f amounts o f 
contaminants on exposed individuals are 
considered to be negl igible ,  should 
widespread screening  even  need to be 
implemented? The response to this question 
is,  of course,  that  the psychological impact  of 
the disaster  exerts considerable  influence on 
how  federal agencies manage their  response. 
While an  extended discussion of the 
psychology  of disaster  responses and threat 
assessments/analyses is beyond the scope of 
this article,  it  is worth  noting that  despite 
assurances from  subject  matter experts that 
the amounts of fallout  from  the Fukushima 
disaster  that  reached the mainland United 
States were minute,  there was a  surge in 
purchases of potassium  iodide on  the part of 
the American public. 16 Accordingly,  Secretary 
Napolitano’s statement  regarding  “an 
exercise of caution”  served to notify  and 
reassure the public that  their  government 
was considering their welfare.
ISSUES SURROUNDING SAFE 
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR 
ENERGY FACILITIES
Obviously,  a  variety  of federal  agencies, 
academic  institutions, private contractors, 
and national  laboratories have been 
conducting  analyses of weapons of mass 
destruction  (WMD)  incidents, with  a  focus on 
treatment options for  casualties in  urban 
areas.  In  my  experience, there is an extensive 
body  of open-source literature (including 
white  papers and peer-reviewed journal 
articles) that  covers such  scenarios.  However, 
the open-source literature concerned with  the 
public health  and environmental quality 
consequences of a  nuclear  accident  is 
comparatively  scant,  and tends to consist  of 
reports by  investigative journalists, as well  as 
policy  and analysis articles by  environmental 
advocacy  organizations. This is particularly 
true of open-source information  dealing  with 
nuclear  power  in  non-Western  nations. 
Consequently, I have out of necessity  used 
this material to reference my  analysis of the 
expansion  of nuclear power in  developing 
countries.
As of January  2012,  the United States 
leads the world with  the largest number  of 
nuclear  power  plants in  operation  (104), 
followed by  France (58), Japan  (51),  and 
Russia  (33). But  the economic growth  and 
attendant  requirements for  increased 
electrical  power  experienced by  developing 
nations has made nuclear  power  an  attractive 
alternative to energy  generated from  coal,  oil, 
and natural gas.  In  contrast  to the 
a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t n u c l e a r  p o w e r 
experienced by  “first  world” nations in  the 
aftermath  of the Fukushima  disaster,  China 
currently  operates fifteen reactors for  power 
generation, has twenty-six  reactors under 
construction, and has plans or  proposals for 
another 120 to be  constructed over the next 
several decades.  India currently  operates 
twenty  reactors,  is constructing  six, and has 
plans to build another  forty. Neither  Thailand 
nor Indonesia  possesses nuclear  reactors at 
present, but  each  country  hopes to build as 
many as six in the near future. 17 
As opposed to the situation  forty  or  fifty 
years ago,  when  contractors in  the United 
States, USSR,  Canada,  and Western Europe 
were the only  entities capable of erecting 
nuclear power  plants, China  has now 
emerged as a  competitive provider of power 
plant construction. This means that 
developing countries are no longer required 
to placate Western  governments in  order to 
gain access to nuclear  facilities; for  example, 
in  the spring  of 2010, an agreement was 
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made between China  and the Pakistan 
government to build two 650-megawatt 
(MW) reactors at the Chashma  nuclear 
complex. 18 
Prior  to the Fukushima  disaster,  the 
nuclear  power  industry  was adamant  that, 
whether emplaced in  first-world or  third-
world nations, nuclear  power  remained a  safe 
and ecologically  acceptable form  of energy 
production.  The World Nuclear  Association 
(formerly  the Uranium  Institute),  an 
advocacy  group formed by  nuclear power 
plant companies, states:
Today, nuclear power  plants  have a 
superb safety  record – both  for  plant 
workers and the public. In  the transport 
of nuclear  material, highly engineered 
containers – capable of withstanding 
enormous impact – are the industrial 
norm. More than  20,000 containers of 
spent fuel  and high-level  waste have been 
shipped safely  over a total  distance 
exceeding  30 million kilometres. During 
the transport of  these and other 
radioactive substances – whether  for 
research, medicine or  nuclear  – there had 
never been a harmful radioactive release.
The radiation produced within the core of 
nuclear reactors is similar to natural 
radiation  but more intense. At nuclear 
power plants, protective shielding isolates 
this radiation, allowing millions of  people 
to live in  safety  nearby. Typically, the 
radiation  people receive comes 90% from 
nature and 10% from medical  exposures. 
Radiation  exposure from  nuclear power is 
negligible.19
N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , p u b l i c c i t i z e n , 
environmental,  and clean energy  activist 
groups in  developing and developed nations 
disagree with  this viewpoint,  and argue that  a 
long  list  of accidents and acts of criminal 
negligence at  nuclear  power  plants are cause 
for concern, if not outright trepidation.
An in-depth  recitation  of such accidents is 
beyond the scope of this article, but  in  the 
aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, 
developments in  Japan  are worth  mentioning 
in this context.
Prior  to the Fukushima event, Japan  relied 
on  fifty-four  nuclear  power  plants to provide 
30 percent  of its electricity  and planned to 
construct  another  twelve reactors in the near 
future. 20 However,  serious problems with  the 
safe and conscientious operation  of these 
nuclear  faci l i t ies were documented. 
According to the World Nuclear Association:
In  2002 a  scandal erupted over the 
documentation of  equipment inspections 
at Tepco's reactors, and extended to other 
plants. While the issues were not safety-
related, the industry's reputation was 
sullied. Inspection of the shrouds and 
p u m p s a r o u n d t h e c o r e i s t h e 
responsibility of  the company, which  in 
this case had contracted it  out. In May 
2002, questions emerged about data 
falsification  and the significance of cracks 
in  reactor  shrouds (used to direct  water 
flow in  BWRs) and whether faults were 
reported to senior  management. By May 
2003 Tepco had shut down all  its 17 
reactors for inspections, and by the end of 
2003 only seven  had been  restarted. 
Replacement power cost on  average over 
50% more than the 5.9 yen/kWh (5.5 
cents US) nuclear generation  cost. Tepco 
now has  all  its reactors back on line, with 
the whole fiasco costing  it about JPY  200 
billion (US$ 1.9 billion).21 
Problems stemmed not  only  from 
negligent maintenance and inspection, but 
also from  geologic disturbances that  occur  in 
Japan.  For example, in  July  16, 2007,  an 
earthquake measuring  6.8  on  the Richter 
scale damaged the Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 
nuclear  power  station  facility  near  Niigata. 
Despite the plant’s location on bedrock 
(excavated in  some places to a  depth  of forty-
five meters, or  more than  147  feet)  – a 
construction  feature implemented to mitigate 
any  damage from  earthquakes – the tremors 
were of sufficient  intensity  to sever  piping 
and electrical assemblies within  the plant. 22 A 
transformer associated with  the external 
power  supply  to the plant caught fire, and 
two hours elapsed before the fire  was 
extinguished. There was leakage of water into 
the confines of the plant, and an  estimated 
90,000 Bq (2.4  µCi)  of radioactive water  were 
discharged into the Sea  of Japan. Radioactive 
gasses containing  isotopes of iodine,  cobalt, 
and chromium  were released from  exhaust 
stack No. 7  in  the aftermath  of the quake, and 
while the amount  estimated to have been 
discharged – 400  million  Bq (10,810 µCi) – 
was not  considered to be a  risk to public 
health, there were concerns that  i t 
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represented damage to the fuel assemblies 
within the reactor. 23 
The damage to the Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 
plant, which resulted in  the suspension of its 
operation  until August  2009, raised 
questions as to whether  even  very  expensive, 
dedicated approaches to “earthquake-
proofing”  a nuclear  reactor  facility  were valid 
when  severe quakes occur. Obviously,  the 
entire concept  of Japanese nuclear  plant 
safety  in  the context of a  natural disaster  was 
severely  tested by  the earthquake and 
tsunami of March  11,  2011  and their  effects 
on  the three operating reactors on  the 
grounds of the Fukushima installation.
The circumstances of the Fukushima 
disaster, which  took  place despite preventive 
measures (such as the presence of backup 
electrical  generators) put  in  place by  Tepco, 
have important  implications for  the 
conscientious operation  of reactors, or 
responses to accidents,  in  developing 
countries. These aspects of plant  operations 
and management  are complicated by  the 
unavoidable corollary  to the generation  of 
nuclear  power: the generation  of radioactive 
waste. 
The Internat ional  Atomic  Energy 
Association  (IAEA),  a nuclear  power 
advocacy  organization,  estimates that  each 
year  approximately  15,500  metric tons of 
highly  radioactive metal waste  are generated 
by  the industry  worldwide.24  The prime 
constituent of this high-level waste is the 
spent  fuel rods removed from  the reactor 
core; these are “hot”  in  both  a  radioactive and 
thermal sense,  and must be stored under 
water to avoid combusting. 
[As indicated earlier  in  this article, the loss 
of water  from  the cooling  pond atop the 
Fukushima Daiichi Reactor  4  building  in the 
aftermath  of the explosion  of March  15 
caused major  consternation  among  Tepco 
personnel]25 
Over  a  lengthy  interval (i.e.,  ten to twenty 
years)  of so-called “interim  storage” the rods 
in  the spent  fuel pools lose enough  heat and 
radioactivity  to be removed from  the water 
pool and placed in  large,  shielded containers 
for “dry” storage.26 
Along  with  the metal  waste, large amounts 
of less hazardous liquid and solid waste are 
produced by  nuclear  reactors.  Needless to 
say,  the storage and processing  of high- and 
low-level  waste is an expensive and politically 
charged feature of nuclear plant operation. 
To provide an  example of the substantial 
economic  and infrastructure resources that 
must be devoted to the “conscientious” 
storage and disposal of wastes associated 
with  reactor  operation,  it  is illuminating  to 
look at some examples of what is done in  first 
world nations. 
In  South  Korea, according  to the World 
Nuclear  Association, currently  all  high-level 
radioactive  waste (approximately  9,000  tons 
of spent  fuel)  is stored at  individual reactor 
sites,  as is intermediate and low  level wastes 
(approximately  60,000 200-liter  drums).  In 
order  to provide a  centralized locale for 
storage and disposal of these wastes,  the 
South  Korean  government has commissioned 
development of an  enormous facility  near  the 
southeastern c i ty  of Gyeongju.  The 
anticipated capacity  of the facility  is 800,000 
drums of intermediate- and low-level 
radioactive  waste.  During  the spring  of 2010, 
the facility  began receiving  200-liter 
containers of radioactive waste for  storage in 
outdoor  areas; in  2012,  this waste is expected 
to be moved to a  series of silos located eighty 
meters (262  feet) underground, for 
permanent storage. 27
For  long-term  storage of its nuclear  waste, 
the Finnish  government has chosen to 
construct  a  network of tunnels out  of the 
bedrock at  the Onkalo facility  on  Olkiluoto 
Island (located northwest  of Helsinki). The 
planning  for  the repository  began in  1970, 
construction  is taking  place from  2004-2010, 
waste will be received starting  in  2020,  and 
the facility  will  not be decommissioned until 
the 2100s. The dimensions of this facility  are 
impressive.  The main  access tunnel will be 
5.5  km  (over  three miles)  long and the lowest 
level in  the facility  will  be located 520  m 
(1,706  feet) underground (for  comparison, 
the former  North  Tower  of the World Trade 
Center  in  New  York  City  was 110 stories, or 
1,368 feet tall) (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Schematic  diagram of the Onkalo facility on Olkiluoto Island, Finland, for long-term storage of 
nuclear waste (from Onkalo: Underground Rock Characterisation Facility at Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, Finland).
The storage design  calls for  waste fuel  rods 
to be packed into large steel and copper 
canisters (the largest  canisters are  over five 
meters, or  seventeen feet,  in  length), which 
will  be placed into cylindrical shafts 
excavated in  the storage areas of the 
underground tunnels; these shafts would be 
filled with  layers of bentonite clay  to cushion 
the emplaced canisters. 28
The Onkalo facility,  which  will  cost an 
estimated 3  billion Euros, is designed to 
safely  store the waste for  as long as 100,000 
years;  it  is unclear  if information  about the 
site can  be maintained in  the racial 
consciousness of Homo sapiens  (or  other 
sentient creatures that  may  evolve during 
such  an epoch) for  such  an  extended period 
of time. Doing  so,  however,  is important, 
because another  Ice Age may  well occur  in 
that  interval  and result  in  the formation of ice 
layers two to three km  thick  over  the burial 
site. The structure of the bedrock of the burial 
site would be affected by  the pressures 
exerted by  such  masses of ice,  but  European 
authorities are confident  that  the copper  and 
steel canisters holding  the waste fuel  rods will 
withstand such compression.29
For  economic  and political  reasons, some 
governments choose to export their 
radioactive  waste. For  example, in 2009  a 
documentary  film-maker  named Eric  Guéret 
released a film  (English  title Waste: The 
Nuclear Nightmare) showing  that the 
Électricité de France company  was obliged to 
ship,  by  rail,  some 108  tons of uranium  waste 
from  its nuclear  plants at La  Hague to a 
restricted storage facility  in  Seversk, a  town 
in  Siberia.  Since the French  government 
permits the uranium  to be classified as a 
“recycled”  product,  rather  than a  hazardous 
waste,  its yearly  transport  is not subjected to 
regulations imposed on  waste shipments per 
se.  Such  transport is a  source of some degree 
of consternation  to communities lying 
alongside the rail route. But the French  are 
not alone in  seeking to export  their  nuclear 
wastes out-of-country; from  1996  to 2001, 
German  plants exported some 1,500 tons of 
waste every  year  to the Seversk facility. 
Expansions of this movement  of radioactive 
waste that  would ensue from  patronage by 
developing countries would arguably  increase 
the risk  of an  accidental  release of material 
during the transport process.30 
It is unclear  if less-developed countries 
have given  adequate thought  to the 
disposition of high-level waste that  is, and 
will be,  generated by  their  own  nuclear  plant 
operations.  It  is likely  that countries like 
Pakistan,  Jordan,  and Armenia  will store 
spent  fuel  generated at newly  constructed 
reactors on-site,  until  it  achieves temperature 
and radiation  levels amenable to removal to 
off-site storage.  It may  be that developing 
nations will  arrange to have their  waste 
transported by  rail  overland to the Seversk 
site, much  as France and Germany  have 
done. 
Alternatively,  less developed countries 
may  contract  to have their  waste interred in 
sites like Onkalo. But  is seems unlikely  – at 
least  in  light  of present-day  economics – that 
developing countries would have the financial 
resources to construct their  own  equivalent of 
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the Onkalo or  Gyeongju  repository. In  view  of 
the difficulties encountered with  the loss of 
coolant  to the spent  fuel pools at  the 
Fukushima reactors,  measures to deal with 
disruptions to on-site storage of nuclear 
waste will be another  costly,  but  critical, 
component of disaster  response planning  for 
nuclear  plants operating  in  developing 
nations. 
CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT IN A DEVELOPING 
NATION
Are we to expect that developing  nations are 
fully  capable of operating  their  own 
burgeoning  supply  of nuclear  power  plants 
with  an attention  to safety  that  approaches 
that  of first  world nations? This is a  troubling 
question, yet a  question  that,  in  the aftermath 
of the Fukushima  accident, deserves more 
attention from  scholars in  the field of 
international relations and analysts in 
academe and government,  who have tended 
to focus on  issues relating  to nuclear 
proliferation, rogue states,  and terrorism,  as 
opposed to the expansion of nuclear power.
I would argue that  social and cultural 
attitudes that  promote malfeasance and 
corruption  in developing nations render 
these nations more likely  to experience a 
disaster  due to negligent  operation of a 
nuclear  power  facility.  For  example,  while 
Denmark  has a  Corruption Perception  Index 
(CPI) score of 9.3,  ranking  first in  the world 
for  honest and forthright  commercial 
exchange, China  has a  CPI score of 3.6, 
ranking  it seventy-second in  the world; India 
has a CPI score of 3.4,  ranking  it eighty-fifth 
in  the world; Pakistan has a  2.5  (134th), and 
Bangladesh a 2.1 (147th).31
Such rankings do not,  in  my  opinion, bode 
well  for  the absence of major  nuclear 
accidents in developing  nations. In  this 
regard,  it  is illuminating to examine the 
current situation  of India’s nuclear  facilities 
with  regard to safe and conscientious 
operation.
OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY: THE CASE OF 
INDIA
Open  source information on  nuclear  safety, 
nuclear  accidents, and preventive measures 
in  India  is not plentiful.  According to an 
October  2009  article in  the Asia Times 
online,  “data  on  the [nuclear  energy] sector 
are c losely  guarded by  the nuclear 
establishment, which  functions under the 
purview  of the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE).” 32
However,  some material on the topic is 
available from  the South  Asian news media. 
One of the more high  profile accidents in  an 
Indian  nuclear  facility  took place in 
November 2009,  when fifty-five employees at 
the Kaiga plant ingested small  amounts of 
radiation  by  drinking  water  from  a  cooler 
that had been (perhaps deliberately) 
contaminated with  tritium.  The ingestion  of 
the isotope was discovered through  routine 
monitoring of the urine of employees. 33 
Another  accident  that received media 
coverage took  place in  December  2009  at  the 
Bhabha  Atomic Research  Centre (BARC), 
India’s main  site for  nuclear  weapons 
development, when  a  fire in a  photochemistry 
laboratory  killed two students.34  It  could be 
a r g u e d t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t , h o w e v e r 
unfortunate,  was not  caused by  acts of 
negligence on  the part of the operation of the 
nuclear  reactors at  BARC.  However, there is a 
history  of incidents associated with  the 
facility  that  suggest safety  has not  received 
adequate attention.  For  example,  soon after 
the Dhruva  reactor  at BARC came online in 
1985, it  experienced a  malfunction  involving 
excessive vibration  due to water  flow  through 
the fuel assemblies: four  metric tons of heavy 
water  overflowed from  the reactor core. 
Operation  was suspended until January  1987, 
and the reactor did not  generate its full power 
until January 1988. 35
After  the resumption  of the reactor, safety 
issues continued to occur. In  1989  a 
technician  was accidentally  locked into a 
shielded room  in  the reactor building; he was 
only  rescued after  he repeatedly  shut  off the 
coolant  pump to the reactor, which  in  turn 
shut down  the reactor  and drew  the attention 
of the staff.  In  1991  the reactor operated for 
nearly  a  month with  a malfunctioning 
emergency  coolant  system. And, according  to 
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investigative journalist  A.  Gopalakrishnan, 
underground pipes used to transport 
radioactive  fluid waste around the BARC 
campus have burst,  contaminating  large 
tracts of the subsoil. Tanks containing  large 
volumes of liquid waste (in  a manner 
reminiscent  of the storage setup that led to 
the Kyshtym  disaster) have been  leaking,  and 
n o t  s u b j e c t e d t o t i m e l y  r e p a i r  o r 
replacement.36
It is unclear  if nuclear  power  plants in 
India have fully  cooperated with  the citizenry 
in  outlining what  is to be done in the event  of 
accident  of major  magnitude.  One grass-roots 
organization, the People’s Movement Against 
Nuclear  Energy, has accused the operators of 
the Koodankulam  nuclear  power  plant in 
Tamil Nadu  state of neglecting  to conduct 
safety  drills,  or  to share evacuation plans, 
with residents in the surrounding areas. 37 
There are indications that  the Fukushima 
event  has introduced a  cautionary  note to the 
expansion  of nuclear  power  in  India; in 
Madban, plans to construct  the world’s 
largest  nuclear power  facility  (the Jaitapur 
Nuclear  Power  Plant, consisting  of six 
reactors) have provoked calls for  a 
moratorium  on  its construction by  Indian 
sc ient is ts and act iv is ts .38  Whether 
construction  will  proceed despite such 
opposition,  and whether  it  will  be conducted 
with  increased attention  to safety  issues, 
remains to be seen.
If,  as I am  positing,  a  major  nuclear 
accident  takes place in  a  developing  nation 
within  the next several decades,  what  is the 
potential severity  of such an  accident, and 
what  type of response will be required of 
homeland security  operations in  the United 
States?
In this context  it  is sobering to note the 
findings of an  interim  report  on the 
Fukushima disaster  released in  December 
2011  by  Tepco.  Among other  findings,  the 
report  discloses that  Tepco officials had 
designed the plant  to withstand a  tsunami 
wave of twenty  feet  in  height; however,  the 
wave that  struck the plant  on  March  11  was 
more than  forty  feet in  height.  In  the 
immediate aftermath  of the earthquake and 
tsunami the workers made the erroneous 
assumption that  the emergency  cooling 
system  for  Reactor  No.  1  was operating, when 
in fact  it was defunct.  The absence of 
adequate cooling  was responsible in part for 
the explosion within the reactor  building the 
next day.  Arrangements to deal with a  loss of 
electrical  power  were inadequate; in  one 
instance,  workers were forced to use car 
batteries to operate valve assemblies 
associated with  the cooling systems. Tepco 
had placed an  emergency  operations center 
about  three miles from  the plant,  but  the 
operations center  was not  adequately 
shielded against  the radiation  exposure that 
would have been  created by  a  nuclear 
disaster; consequently, it  was of questionable 
utility  during the Fukushima crisis.  Data  on 
the dispersal of radionuclides resulting  from 
the reactor  explosion  were not  forwarded to 
the government  in  a  timely  manner. As a 
result,  on  March  12,  8,000 evacuees from  the 
town  of Namie, near  the Daiichi complex, 
traveled to the village of Tsushima  with  the 
expectation  that it was safer  than  Namie. In 
fact,  the extent of radionuclide contamination 
at Tsushima exceeded that of Namie. 
More revelations will undoubtedly  be 
brought  to light in  the next  six  months,  but it 
is apparent that  despite their  considerable 
experience in  the design,  construction, and 
operation  of nuclear  power facilities, both 
Tepco and the Japanese government  had so 
discounted the likelihood of an  accident  at 
t h e F u k u s h i m a  c o m p l e x t h e y  w e r e 
unprepared to cope with  the totality  of events 
triggered by the March 11 earthquake.39
As of December 2011,  the cost  for  dealing 
with  the disaster  at  the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear  power  plant is estimated to be $257 
billion  and to require several  decades to 
complete, by  every  measure a  sizable cost  to 
one of the world’s most  affluent nations.40 It 
is doubtful that  equivalent financial resources 
could be brought  to bear  by  the governments 
of developing  nations on  a  disaster  within 
their borders.
PROXIMITY TO POPULATION CENTERS: THE 
CASE OF BANGLADESH 
Most  of the developing  nations using,  or 
contemplating  using, nuclear  power  plants 
share a  problem  confronting  Japan  and its 
handling  of the Fukushima  disaster: close 
proximity  of the reactor site  to population 
centers. For  example,  Bangladesh  has 
contracted with  a  Russian firm  to construct 
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two reactors at  the Rooppur site in  Pabna 
District. 41 The Rooppur site is only  about 180 
km  (112  miles) from  Dhaka; a  reactor 
explosion that  distributes radionuclides 
(Table 2)  over  an  area equivalent to only  half 
that  of the Kyshtym  disaster  of 1957  (for 
example) would hypothetically  contaminate 
the largest  population  center  in  Bangladesh.42 
It is unclear  if the Bangladesh  government 
would be able to execute  an  evacuation  of 
large numbers of people from  a  heavily 
populated area, such  as that surrounding  the 
Rooppur site, should an  accident take place. 
The alternative to evacuation,  having  people 
remain within  contaminated zones,  may  be 
the only  recourse available to the Bangladesh 
government. 
Such  a  scenario would constitute a 
humanitarian  challenge of unprecedented 
scope, since it is doubtful the government 
would be able to supply  the affected 
multitudes with  necessary  quantities of 
uncontaminated drinking  water  and food for 
what  may  be months (if not years) of post-
accident  habitation.  Indeed, it is likely  that 
millions of Bangladeshis would unwillingly 
be forced to inhale radionuclides in  their  air, 
as well as ingesting  them  from  contaminated 
fresh water, crops,  and food animals. 
Providing  adequate medical care to such  a 
large number  of exposed persons would be an 
extremely  difficult  endeavor  for  the 
Bangladesh  government, thus,  morbidity  and 
mortality  due to exposure to beta- and 
gamma-radiation  emissions presumably 
would be very high. 
Particularly  worrisome with  regard to 
potential  casualties is the prevalence of 
m a l n u t r i t i o n  a m o n g  B a n g l a d e s h i s , 
particularly  women and children; in  a 
1984-2005  survey  of admissions to a  hospital 
in Dhaka, 47  percent of children were 
underweight, 30  percent  were stunted,  and 
22  percent were “wasting” (i.e.,  losing 
weight).43  Such  individuals,  with  their 
immune systems already  handicapped by 
m a l n u t r i t i o n ,  w i l l  f a c e a d d i t i o n a l 
immunosuppression  from  the effects of 
ionizing radiation.  This will exacerbate their 
vulnerability  to infectious diseases, which 
may  be a  major threat to public health if large 
numbers of exposed persons are gathered 
i n t o r e f u g e e c a m p s . T h e h i s t o r i c a l 
experiences of Bangladesh  in  regard to 
cyclone-associated mortality  are of import  in 
this regard; for  the 1970  and 1991  cyclones, 
the estimated mortality  figures were 300,000 
and 138,000  deaths, respectively. A 
considerable proportion of this mortality  was 
assumed to be derived from  causes not 
directly  associated with  drowning,  or severe 
physical  injuries,  associated with the cyclone 
per se,  but  rather  from  disease spreading  in 
the storm’s aftermath.44  In  the event  of a 
catastrophic  nuclear  accident in Bangladesh, 
mortality  statistics of this magnitude are 
depressingly likely.
Even  if casualties due to exposure to 
radionuclides would be small,  the economic 
consequences of a nuclear  disaster  in  a 
developing nation  such  as Bangladesh  would 
be significant. The lesson  from  the Chernobyl 
accident  is sobering: milk throughout much 
of northern Europe and the British  isles was 
discarded due to contamination  with  131I and, 
to a  lesser  extent, 90Sr. When  testing 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t m a n y  l i v e s t o c k h a d 
accumulated significant  quantities of 
radionuclides in  their  tissues,  restrictions 
were placed on  the slaughter  of animals for 
use in  the human  food chain.  With  regard to 
international trade, many  nations imposed 
bans and restrictions on  a  variety  of 
agricultural  products; for  example, Germany 
banned the importation  of Italian  vegetables, 
while Italy  in  turn  banned imports from 
Austria,  the  Eastern  Bloc, Scandinavia  and 
Switzerland.  Outside the European Economic 
Community,  Sri Lanka  destroyed imports 
from  Europe, and Jordan refused imports of 
goods from  some countries for  up to three 
months following the accident.45 
Early  on  in  the Fukushima  disaster  many 
countries restricted food imports from  Japan, 
particularly  seafood. 46  In  July  2011,  the 
disclosure that nearly  1,500  beef cattle  had 
consumed rice straw  from  the Fukushima 
area; that beef from  these animals harbored 
concentrations of radioactive cesium  well  in 
excess of government thresholds; and that 
some citizens had unwittingly  consumed this 
beef, has had a  deleterious impact on  the 
Japanese beef industry.47 
For  developing  nations, particularly  those 
that  rely  on  agricultural  exports as a  major 
source of revenue,  loss of such  income for an 
indefinite period of time may  provoke a 
collapse of the national  economy.  Such 
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economic travails may  exacerbate the 
increased movement of refugees or  migrants 
from the affected country.
SCOPE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A 
NUCLEAR DISASTER OVERSEAS
The Fukushima disaster  has demonstrated 
the nature of DHS operations in  the event of 
a  nuclear  disaster  overseas (albeit  one taking 
p l a c e i n a  f i r s t - w o r l d n a t i o n  w i t h 
considerable economic and technologic 
resources available to combat the disaster). 
What  radioactive contaminants are 
associated with  the Fukushima  disaster  and 
being monitored by  CBP? As is shown  in 
Table 2,  among  the list of possible 
radionuclides ejected from  a reactor 
explosion  are a  number  with  comparatively 
short  half-lives, such  as 131I,  133Xe and 140Ba. 
Other  radionuclides possess lengthy  (i.e., 
hundreds of years) half-lives,  including 90Sr, 
137Cs,  and isotopes of plutonium. Some 
radionuclides are beta-emitters,  such  as 90Sr, 
while others are gamma-emitters, such  as 
137Cs.  In  the initial aftermath  of the disaster, 
attention  was focused on the dispersal  of 
gamma  emitters such  as 131I and isotopes of 
cesium, although  soil sampling from  March 
2011  revealed,  in  addition  to these species, 
the presence of (short-lived)  isotopes of 















plutonium-239 (α) 9 x 106
curium-242 (α) 163
Table 2.Selected radionuclides that may be 
ejected from a reactor core in the event of an 
explosion or fire.49
The main  agency  within  DHS playing  a 
role in  the response to the Fukushima 
disaster  is Customs and Border Patrol  (CBP). 
Indications are that  in  the aftermath  of the 
Fukushima incident, DHS technologies such 
as radiation  portal monitors (RPM)  and 
Hand-Held Radioisotope Identification 
Devices (HHRIID) are proving  useful  in  a 
new  role in  screening  incoming  cargo for 
radionuclides associated with  the Fukushima 
incident. 50 As mentioned at  the start of this 
article,  CBP was conducting  screening of 
incoming  cargo and persons from  the affected 
area  for  the presence of radioactive 
contamination; judging  by  open-source 
information,  CBP management  of this 
process led to some delays in  the transport  of 
goods received at  shipping  ports,  but  overall, 
there did not  appear to be a  deleterious effect 
on  cargo movement.51 This is despite the fact 
that some CBP operations were being 
conducted at  some distance from  port 
facilities; according  to a  March  25, 2011 
article in  The Journal of Commerce, the 
Coast Guard and CBP were tracking vessels 
transiting  the fifty-mile fallout  zone around 
the Fukushima site en  route to the United 
States,  with radiation  screening of ship 
contents being  conducted at  sea  i f 
warranted.52
CBP was also assisting  the FDA  with  the 
logistics of screening incoming food and 
HIGGINS, THE NEXT MELTDOWN   11
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 2 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
pharmaceutical products from  Japan. As of 
January  12,  2012,  the FDA  had tested 1,923 
food samples, only  one of which  had 
detectable levels of 137Cs / 134Cs.53 All testing 
evidently  has been performed at  the 
Winchester  Engineering and Analytical 
Center  (WEAC) in  Winchester, MA, with the 
six  laboratories participating  in the Food 
Emergency  Response Network  (FERN) 
capable of buttressing  this capacity  if 
needed.54 
To summarize,  as best can  be inferred in 
January  2012,  DHS operations (both 
individually  and in  conjunction  with  other 
federal  agencies) to screen  incoming cargo 
and persons from  Japan  for  radionuclides 
worked success fu l ly .  DHS deserves 
commendation  for  rapidly  responding to a 
scenario that deviated significantly  from 
those its operations were originally  devised to 
address (i.e., nuclear terrorism).  
One aspect of the Fukushima  incident  has 
not necessarily  been  very  informative for 
planning  for  DHS responses to a nuclear 
disaster  in  a  developing country: namely, the 
advent of large numbers of refugees and 
emigrants seeking  admission  to the United 
States. While the days immediately  after  the 
disaster  saw  a  sudden  exodus of foreigners 
from  Japan,  comparatively  few  of these 
individuals had received significant  exposure 
to radionuclides.55  It seems reasonable to 
propose that,  in  the event of a  nuclear 
disaster  in  a  nation  adjoining  the continental 
United States (e.g., Mexico or  Canada),  large 
numbers of individuals will  be exposed to 
fallout  and a  larger  proportion  of these 
individuals may  seek to enter  the United 
States. Not  all of these individuals will 
represent  foreign  nationals or refugees; some 
may  be US citizens and dependents. While it 
appears that  the screening  of persons 
entering  the United States in  the aftermath of 
the Fukushima  disaster  was carried out  with 
reasonable efficiency,  whether  such  screening 
procedures would be practicable  in  the event 
of a  catastrophe in  a  nation  neighboring  the 
United States, and a  concomitant influx  of 
larger  numbers of affected individuals,  is 
unclear.  This may  be one of the more 
challenging duties that will await  CBP in the 
event  of a  nuclear  disaster  in a  country 
adjacent to the United States.
For  an  example with  relevance to such  a 
scenario, a modeling  study  by  Canadian 
investigators looked at  high-throughput 
screening  of as many  as 20,000 exposed 
individuals,  who walked past a  portal-based 
gamma  detector.  The extent of contamination 
was hypothesized to range from  forty  to 900 
MBq for  137Cs.  For  comparative purposes,  the 
screening  of 300  people involved in the 
Goiania (Brazil) contamination event 
recorded a  maximum  137Cs contamination 
level of forty-two MBq.56  When  screened in 
groups of five,  individuals contaminated with 
seven  MBq of 137Cs could be detected,  while 
an  exposure corresponding  to 1.2  MBq of 
137Cs was undetectable. The investigators 
noted that  the speed of the screening  process 
was obviously  dependent  on  factors such  as 
the cooperation of the exposed persons,  as 
well as the physical mobility  of the 
individuals, their  familiarity  with  the 
language used by  the screening staff,  and the 
efficiency  with  which  groups of people could 
be organized in  a  large area  as part  of the pre-
screening  procedure. The model predicted 
that  screening  of 20,000 people under  a 
sixteen-hour-per-day  regimen required 
twelve to forty-three days,  depending  on  the 
size of the screening  groups.  If multiple 
monitors were deployed, the screening  time 














Table 3. Estimated time required to screen 20,000 
persons exposed to the equivalent of 7 MBq 137Cs 
using different screening group sizes.58
These types of modeling  studies can  be 
useful in  estimating  the radiation  monitoring 
capacity  that may  be required of DHS in 
HIGGINS, THE NEXT MELTDOWN   12
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 2 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
order  to screen incoming  persons in  the 
aftermath  of a nuclear  accident  resulting  in  a 
greater exposed population than  the 
Fukushima incident. As well,  dealing  with  a 
population of incoming  persons that  may  not 
be fluent  in English, and may  be suffering 
from  a  variety  of physical and emotional 
ailments,  will present  special challenges to 
the staff of such  screening  operations.  In  this 
context,  some experts advocate for  additional 
research  and development of methodologies 
for  effectively  communicating  monitoring 
procedures and results to screened 
individuals.59 
While the knowledge gained from 
operations associated with  the Fukushima 
incident  will  be useful,  more information 
regarding  the logistical  challenges associated 
with  setting  up and operating  high-
throughput  screening  operations at  major 
airports or  other  facilities will  be needed to 
enhance CBP capabilities in this area. 
How  long will DHS need to plan to provide 
screening  for  imported goods, refugees, and 
detainees? The question  is difficult to answer 
and depends on  a  number  of factors, chief of 
which  is the ability  of the affected nation  to 
implement measures to restrict  the export of 
potential ly  contaminated goods and 
materials,  as well as to provide medical  care 
to exposed persons.  If the Chernobyl  disaster 
is any  guide,  there is a disturbing  likelihood 
that  as time goes on,  materials containing 
radionuclides will  be transported from  the 
accident  zone into other  areas, as clandestine 
movement  of materials from  contaminated 
sites will  be hard to police by  a  government 
strained with  the task  of addressing the 
massive social and economic problems 
ensuing  from  the event.60  Accordingly,  DHS 
may  need to implement  screening  measures 
for  several years in  the aftermath  of a nuclear 
accident  in  a  developing country, as economic 
and political problems stemming from  an 
inability  to deal  with  the disaster  may 
continuously  generate a  stream  of refugees 
seeking admission to the United States. 
CONCLUSION
In  contrast to historical nuclear disasters 
such  as the Kyshtym  explosion and the 
Windscale fire, both  of which took place in 
1957, the Fukushima  nuclear  disaster  was not 
caused by  human error  per se; rather, it was 
triggered by  two successive geologic 
disturbances for  which  the facility  was 
unprepared: an  earthquake and a tsunami.61 
It could be argued that  this was a  rare 
coincidence and unlikely  to be the cause of 
failure at other  nuclear  facilities.  However, in 
this article I have posited that  in  the case of 
nuclear  power  plants operating, or  planned to 
operate,  in developing  nations, a  number  of 
factors other  than  unprecedented geologic 
disturbances may  contribute to increased risk 
for a catastrophic incident. 
In  the case of Iran,  for  example, the use of 
outdated equipment  may  be the issue; in 
February  2011, reports surfaced in  the news 
media  that  the forthcoming  startup of Iran’s 
nuclear  reactor at  Bushehr  had been 
indefinitely  delayed. Rosatom, the Russian 
firm  supervising the reactor’s construction, 
announced that one of the four  cooling 
pumps had been  damaged and needed to be 
replaced; this meant  that  the fuel had to be 
removed from  the reactor  core,  a  lengthy  and 
expensive process. The pumps date from  the 
1970s, when a  West  German firm  had 
contracted to build the reactor, but withdrew 
fo l lowing  the 1979  revolut ion. The 
incorporation of these obsolete pumps into 
the Bushehr  facility  is not  only  difficult  from 
an  engineering  point  of view, but raises 
questions as to their  effectiveness once the 
reactor becomes operational. 62 
The DHS,  and CBP in particular, has 
demonstrated the ability  to respond in  an 
effective manner  to the Fukushima  disaster. 
This bodes well for  DHS operations in  the 
event of a  nuclear  catastrophe in  Iran, 
Bangladesh, or  another  developing  nation 
that  (unlike Japan) will  lack  the economic 
and political  structures to deal with  such  an 
event. It  is reasonable to expect  that in  such a 
scenario DHS will  need to expand its 
capabilities to screen incoming  persons and 
goods for  contamination. As this article  has 
pointed out, further  investigations and 
analyses are needed in these areas to ensure 
that  the agency  is well  positioned to deal  with 
the unusual nature of such a crisis.
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